Moral Obligation, Self-Interest and The Transitivity Problem by Archer, Alfred
 1 
Moral Obligation, Self-Interest and The Transitivity Problem 
Abstract 
Is the relation ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ transitive? The answer seems to 
be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and 
Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally 
permissible alternative to A? However, as both Dale Dorsey and Frances Kamm point 
out, there are cases where this transitivity appears problematic. My aim in this paper 
is to provide a solution to this problem. I will then investigate two ways in which we 
might justify rejecting the transitivity of the ‘is a permissible alternative to’ relation. 
Next, I will look at Dorsey’s solution, which involves a reinterpretation of the 
intuitions used to generate the problem. I will argue that none of these solutions are 
fully satisfying before going on to provide a novel solution to the problem and argue 
that it avoids the problems facing the extant solutions. 
Introduction 
Is the relation ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ transitive? The answer seems to 
be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and 
Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally 
permissible alternative to A? However, as both Dale Dorsey1 and Frances Kamm2 
point out, there are cases where this transitivity appears problematic. I will call this 
problem, The Transitivity Problem.  
                                                        
1 (2013). 
2 (1985; 2001). 
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This problem raises important issues for moral philosophy. If it turns out that this 
relation is intransitive then this might raise concerns about our ability to give a 
systematic account of what makes an act morally permissible or impermissible. As a 
result, this discussion will have implications for the question of which normative 
ethical view fits best with commonsense morality. After all, it is particularly 
incumbent upon consequentialists to give a full ranking of acts from better to worse 
and use this ranking to determine which acts are morally permissible. If it turns out 
that ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ is an intransitive relation then this raises 
serious doubts about the prospects for doing so.3 Finally, this discussion about moral 
requirements and transitivity raises issues about practical requirements more 
generally. If it turns out that ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ is an intransitive 
relation then we might wonder whether the same is true for the ‘is a rationally 
permissible alternative to’ relation.  
My aim in this paper is to provide a solution to this problem. I will start in §1 by 
giving a precise outline of the problem. I will then, in §2, set out three desiderata that 
a satisfactory solution to the problem should satisfy. In the next two sections I will 
investigate three potential solutions to the problem that fail to satisfy these three 
desiderata. First in §3, I will explore two ways in which we might justify rejecting the 
transitivity of the ‘is a permissible alternative to’ relation. I will then, in §4 investigate 
Dorsey’s solution, which involves a reinterpretation of the intuitions used to generate 
the problem in §1. I will then, in §5, lay out a novel solution to the problem which 
defends a limited form of transitivity by outlining a new theory of moral reasons that 
holds that there are three different moral roles that reasons can play: a moral 
                                                        
3 Kamm (1985 p.136) makes a similar point.  
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justifying role, a moral requiring role and moral favouring role. I will finish in §6 by 
considering and responding to an objection that could be raised against my solution.  
1. The Problem 
In this section I will explain what The Transitivity Problem is. To start I will present 
three examples: 
Case One: Suppose that Charlie, a student nurse, is leaving his house one morning to 
attend a final year exam. As he leaves his house he notices an injured woman, Jane, 
lying on the pavement. After a quick assessment, it is clear to Charlie that, though her 
condition is far from critical, Jane needs to go to hospital. Moreover, the more quickly 
she gets to hospital the less complicated her recovery will be. He is then faced with a 
choice. He could drive Jane to the hospital himself, this would get her there more 
quickly but it would also mean missing his exam, as it is being held on the other side 
of town from the hospital. Missing the exam will mean having to wait two months to 
take a re-sit. Alternatively, he could phone an ambulance and wait with her until it 
comes. This would mean that he could still attend the exam, though it would increase 
the time it takes for the woman to get to hospital and, as a result, increase the time it 
takes her to recover from her injury.  
Case Two: Charlie from Case One decides that he will drive Jane to the hospital. 
Unfortunately, his car won’t start. Charlie thinks through his options. He has the keys 
to his neighbour’s house, as he has been watering her plants while she is on holiday. 
He also knows where she keeps her car keys. He could, then, borrow his neighbour’s 
car. However, Charlie’s neighbour has not given him permission to borrow her car. 
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Case Three: Charlie from Cases One and Two leaves his house to go to the exam but 
this time he does not find an injured woman on the street. Unfortunately, his car won’t 
start. Charlie thinks about what to do. If he doesn’t drive to the exam he will not get 
there in time. He realises he could borrow his neighbour’s car, though he does not 
have permission to do so.  
Having presented these three cases I will now make three claims about these cases.  
Claim One: In Case One it is morally permissible for Charlie to go to the exam rather 
than taking Jane to hospital. It would, though, be morally better for Charlie to drive 
Jane to hospital. The reason for this is that Charlie’s self-interested reasons morally 
justify the performance of the less morally favoured act.4 
In Case One it is plausible to think that whilst it would be morally good to drive Jane 
to the hospital, he is not morally required to do so. In other words, it looks as if doing 
so would be supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. Moreover, it seems reasonable 
to think that what prevents the act from being morally obligatory in this case are the 
self-interested reasons that count against driving Jane to the hospital. If, for example, 
the exam were being held at the hospital then it might be plausible to say that Charlie 
is morally required to drive her there. This example, then, is a case where the morally 
best act available, taking the injured woman to the hospital, is prevented from 
generating an obligation by the self-interested reasons that count against performing 
the act.  
                                                        
4 This is not to say that there are no moral reasons that support going to the exam but 
just that taking Jane to hospital is the morally better act of the two.  
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This claim is one that would be endorsed by many theorists working on the nature of 
supererogation. It is commonly held that what prevents supererogatory acts from 
being obligatory are the costs to the agent’s self-interest that performing the act 
involves.5 According to Douglas Portmore’s recent defence of this position, reasons 
that do not count for or against performing the act from the moral point of view may 
nevertheless play a morally justificatory role and make otherwise forbidden acts 
permissible. Even those who don’t think that this is true for all acts of supererogation 
accept that it is true for many such acts.6 If this is right and this act is an example of 
such a case, then it is the agent’s self-interested reasons that serve to morally justify 
the non-performance of the morally better act.  
Claim Two: In Case Two it is permissible and morally better for Charlie to take the 
car in order to drive the injured woman to hospital. This is because the moral reasons 
that support taking the woman to hospital override the moral reasons that count 
against taking the car.  
In normal circumstances, it would be morally wrong for Charlie to borrow his 
neighbour’s car without permission. However, clearly there are cases where it would 
be permissible to do so. Suppose, for example, that Charlie would save someone’s life 
by taking the car. In this case it seems permissible to do so. The importance of 
respecting the neighbour’s property rights are surely outweighed by the fact that a life 
is at stake. Any plausible moral theory then, will accept that it can be morally 
permissible to violate one person’s property rights in order to prevent some level of 
harm befalling some other person. While, transporting someone to hospital more 
                                                        
5 See Dancy (1993 p. 138), Mellema (1991 p.179) and Portmore (2003).  
6 Eg. Horgan and Timmons (2010 p.60) and Rawls (1971 p.117).  
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quickly is not quite so important as saving a life, it seems reasonable to think that this 
is sufficiently important to justify taking the car and that the reason this is so is that 
this act is morally better than not taking the car and waiting for the ambulance. Both 
Dorsey and Kamm draw similar conclusions from similar cases. Dorsey claims that it 
would be morally permissible to beat someone up if this would save ten people from 
death.7 Beating someone up is normally morally wrong but in the case where it is 
morally better to do so than to not do so it is morally permissible. Kamm claims that it 
is morally permissible to break a promise to meet a friend for lunch in order to save a 
life. Again, breaking a promise is usually morally wrong but in the case where doing 
so can save a life it seems morally permissible.8  
Claim Three: In Case Three it is not permissible for Charlie to take his neighbour’s 
car in order to get to the exam on time. This is because the moral reasons that count 
against taking the neighbour’s car override the self-interested reasons that count in 
favour of doing so.  
In Case Three it does not seem plausible to think that it is morally permissible for 
Charlie to borrow his neighbours car without permission. The fact that Charlie will 
miss his exam if he does not borrow the car does not seem to justify taking the car 
without permission. Dorsey draws a similar conclusion from the case he considers. 
Dorsey says that while it is permissible to beat someone up to save ten lives, it is not 
permissible to do so in order to get the money to buy a new car. 9  
                                                        
7 (2013 p.366). 
8 (1996 p.314).   
9 (2013 p.366). 
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Claims One, Two and Three are independently plausible yet together they seem 
puzzling. If we accept Claims One, Two and Three then this shows that ‘is a morally 
permissibility alternative to’ is not a transitive relation. After all, the result of these 
three claims is that going to the exam is a morally permissible alternative to driving 
Jane to hospital. This in turn is a morally permissible alternative to not taking a 
neighbour’s car without permission. However, going to the exam is not a morally 
permissible alternative to not taking a neighbour’s car without permission.10 
The basic thought that makes this puzzling is that it seems reasonable to think that if 
some reasons can play a morally justifying when they conflict with moral reasons of a 
certain strength then they should also be capable of doing so when they conflict with 
weaker moral reasons. We can formalise this claim in the following way: 
Claim Four: If reasons R are capable of playing a moral justificatory role against 
moral reasons of strength s then, for any positive value of x, R should be capable of 
playing that role against moral reasons of strength s - x.11   
This claim seems plausible, yet it is incompatible with the other three. To see why 
let’s stipulate that the moral reasons that count in favour of taking the woman to the 
hospital have strength s. Claim Two says that the moral reasons that count against 
taking the neighbour’s car without permission are less strong than those that count in 
                                                        
10 This issue is raised by Kamm raises (1996 p.312-313).  Kamm, though, says that it 
is the relation ‘may take precedence over’ that fails to be transitive.  
11 This is the way that Dorsey raises the problem (2013 p.367). It is worth noting that 
Claim Four is necessary but not sufficient for transitivity. Even if we reject the claim 
that the ‘is a morally permissible alternative relation’ is transitive, then, we might still 
want to accept Claim Four. Thanks to Alexander Bird for helpful discussion here.  
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favour of driving the woman to hospital. Let’s call this difference in strength x. Now 
we can see that if we accept Claim Four then if the costs to Charlie’s self-interest can 
morally justify not performing the morally better act in Case One then they should 
also be able to in Case Three. Claims One, Two, Three and Four, then, are 
independently plausible but jointly inconsistent.  
Before proceeding it is worth briefly mentioning that this problem is distinct from a 
related issue of transitivity that has been explored in depth by Larry Temkin and 
Stuart Rachels.12 According to Temkin and Rachels a number of problems arise if we 
accept that the ‘is better than all things considered’ relation is transitive. The problem 
I will consider here, though, concerns the transitivity of the ‘is a morally permissible 
alternative to’ relation. Of course, we might think that if the first form of transitivity is 
problematic then it is unsurprising that the second is as well. Nevertheless, the 
problem discussed above is not dependent on any problems with the form of 
intransitivity that Temkin and Rachels discuss. After all, the ‘is better than all things 
considered’ does appear to be operating as if it were transitive in these three cases. 
Driving Jane to hospital is morally better than refusing to take the neighbour’s car 
which in turn is better than taking the car in order to go to the exam. Transitivity is 
preserved because it is also the case that driving Jane to hospital is better than driving 
to the exam. This problem is worth considering then, even if we reject the transitivity 
of the ‘is better than all things considered’ relation.  
2. Three Desiderata  
                                                        
12 See Temkin (2012) and Rachels (1998). Ingmar Persson (2013 p.39) also denies the 
transitivity of the permissibility relation because he denies the transitivity of the 
betterness relation (though his reasons for denying this relation differ from Temkin’s).    
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In this section I will briefly outline three desiderata that a successful solution to the 
problem should satisfy.  
First, a satisfying solution will respect the intuitions captured by Claims One, Two, 
Three and Four. We saw in §1 good reason to accept these claims and, all else being 
equal, a solution that respects these intuitions will be preferable to one that does not. 
Of course, there is more than one way to respect intuitions. We can do so by 
providing a vindicating explanation or we can respect the force of these intuitions by 
offering a debunking explanation. Either way, though, we should be looking for a 
solution to provide some kind of explanation for these intuitions. I will call this 
desideratum RESPECT THE INTUITIONS.  
Second, we should seek a solution to the problem that does not lead us to abandon the 
project that led us to consider The Problem of Transitivity in the first place. This 
problem arises out of attempts to provide a unified explanation of the connection 
between moral permissibility and reasons for action. One way of responding to the 
problem, then, would be to simply abandon the project of looking for such a 
connection. However, this response should only be adopted as a last resort. Given that 
this project is one of great philosophical interest, both in its own right and for the 
potentially interesting implications for moral philosophy, we should look for a 
solution to this problem that does not require us to abandon this project. I will call this 
desideratum SAVE THE PROJECT. 
Finally, we should look for a solution that provides a full solution to the problem. 
This desideratum is fairly self-explanatory but it is worth briefly stating what a full 
solution to the problem would be. A full solution to the problem will be one that does 
not leave any puzzling aspects of the problem unaddressed. This requires not only 
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addressing the problem as outlined in §1 but also any problems that arise from the 
proposed solution. I will call this desideratum SOLVE THE PROBLEM. 
3. Rejecting Transitivity 
In this section I will investigate whether it is plausible to solve the problem by 
rejecting the transitivity of the ‘is a moral permissible alternative to’ relation. There 
are two ways to justify rejecting this transitivity and I will examine each in turn.  
3.1 Kamm’s Solution 
Kamm’s response to this problem is to provide an explanation as to why this relation 
is not transitive. According to Kamm, there is no single scale upon which we can 
decide whether one act may take priority over another. The reason Kamm gives for 
this is that the acts in the three cases are being evaluated from different points of 
view: the point of view of overall good, the point of view of personal interests and 
goals and the point of view of the minimal standards of morality. We are, says Kamm, 
entitled to pursue our personal goals rather than performing a supererogatory act 
because of a personal prerogative to pursue our own projects and goals that is derived 
from the value of people as ends-in-themselves.13 We are also, says Kamm entitled to 
perform a supererogatory act instead of a duty because this is best from the point of 
overall good from the impartial perspective.14 However, we are not entitled to pursue 
our personal projects rather than performing our duties because of the moral 
importance that everyone meets the minimal standards of morality.15  
                                                        
13 (2001 p.336-7; 2007 p.31) 
14 (2001 p.336; 2007 p.31) 
15 (2001 p.337; 2007 p.31) 
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The reason why there is no transitivity here is because some acts (minimal standards 
of duty) are requirable at high personal cost while others are not. So we can be 
required to sacrifice our personal preference in order to meet the minimal standards of 
duty even though we would not be required to sacrifice our personal preference in 
order to perform a supererogatory act. This explains why the ‘is a permissible 
alternative relation’ is intransitive. As these three acts are being evaluated from three 
different points of view and no point of view dominates over both of the others, we 
should not expect there to be a transitive relation between them. 
When we apply this solution to our three cases we can see that it does a good job of 
respecting our intuitions. Claim One said that in Case One it is morally permissible 
for Charlie to go to the exam rather than taking Jane to hospital. Kamm’s account can 
justify this intuition by saying that this is a case of a personal preference making it 
morally permissible not to perform a supererogatory act. Claim Two says that in Case 
Two it is permissible and morally better for Charlie to take the car in order to drive 
the injured woman to hospital Kamm’s account can justify this intuition by pointing 
out that in this case the fact that taking the woman to hospital will be better from the 
point of view of overall good means that it is permissible to perform this act instead 
of respecting the neighbour’s property rights.. After all, the costs facing Jane if she 
does not get to the hospital will be greater than those facing Charlie if he does not get 
to his exam on time. Finally, Kamm can also capture Claim Three that in Case Three 
it is not permissible for Charlie to take his neighbour’s car in order to get to the exam 
on time. Kamm’s account can capture this claim by saying that the minimal standards 
of duty require respecting property rights over the pursuit of personal projects in this 
case. Kamm’s account then, is able to satisfy RESPECT THE INTUITIONS.  
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Kamm’s account also seems to satisfy SOLVE THE PROBLEM. Kamm’s account 
provides a vindicating explanation for the apparent intransitivity of the morally 
permissible alternative to relation. According to Kamm, the reason this relation is not 
transitive is that these acts are being assessed from different points of view and that 
none of these points of view dominates the other two. This explains why the ‘is a 
morally permissible alternative to’ relation is not transitive. Though Kamm does not 
make this point explicit, her account also points towards a reasonable debunking 
explanation for the intuitive oddness of denying transitivity here. Kamm can say that 
the reason that the intuitive plausibility of the transitivity depends upon the false 
belief that we can order these different points of view in order of normative 
importance. Kamm’s account then, not only explains why we should reject the 
transitivity of this relation but also explains why it seemed plausible to think that this 
relation would be transitive.  
However, Kamm’s account does less well with respect to the final desideratum, 
SAVE THE PROJECT. As I explained in §2, ideally we want a solution to the 
problem to allow us to explain the connection between moral permissibility and 
reasons for action. Kamm’s account though, leaves us unable to make any general 
claims about the connection between moral reasons and moral permissibility. On 
Kamm’s account, we can say that in some situations it will be permissible to act in 
line with what is best from the point of view of overall good rather than what would 
meet the minimal standards of duty. In other cases it will be permissible to pursue our 
self-interest rather than overall good. However, given the importance of maintaining 
the minimal standards of duty, in many cases it will not be permissible to fail to meet 
the minimum standards of duty in order to pursue one’s self-interest. Kamm’s 
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solution then, abandons the project of trying to provide a unified account of the 
connection between moral reasons, self-interested reasons and moral permissibility.  
Of course, this problem seems unlikely to worry Kamm much. As a non-
consequentialist, Kamm is not committed to there being any unified way of 
explaining the connection between moral reasons and moral permissibility. Kamm’s 
approach to moral philosophy is one that seeks to develop intricate principles that 
capture the complexity of our moral intuitions.16 Given the complexity of our moral 
intuitions in these cases, it seems reasonable for Kamm to respond by claiming that 
we should not expect to be able to give a unified account of the connection between 
moral reasons and moral permissibility. Moreover, to demand this from Kamm might 
be thought to beg the question against her non-consequentialist approach. Starting 
from the assumption that we should be able to give a unified account of the 
connection between moral reasons and moral permissibility might reasonably be 
thought to prejudice the debate against a deontologist’s solution to the problem.  
For these reasons, I think it would be wrong to say that Kamm’s failure to satisfy 
SAVE THE PROJECT gives us reason to reject her solution. However, given that the 
project of finding an unified account of the connection between moral reasons and 
moral permissibility is of great importance to consequentialists, I think it does give us 
reason to ask whether an alternative solution can be offered that does not give up on 
this project. After all, if such a solution to this problem cannot be found then this 
seems likely to count as a mark against consequentialism. This, I think, gives us 
sufficient reason to ask whether we can give a solution that allows us to give a more 
unified account of the connection between moral reasons and moral permissibility.  
                                                        
16 See Kamm (2007 p.14-15).  
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3.2 A Holist Solution 
Another way in which we might be tempted to reject Claim Four is to endorse some 
form of Holism about reasons. Reasons Holism is defined by Jonathan Dancy as the 
view that, “a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an 
opposite reason, in another.”17 This view contrasts with Reasons Atomism, which 
Dancy defines as the view that, “a feature that is a reason in one case must remain a 
reason, and retain the same polarity, in any other.”18 Accepting Holism opens up a 
new way to justify rejecting Claim Four. The reason why the ‘morally permissible 
alternative to’ relation is not transitive is that reasons that play one role in one case 
may play no role or an opposite role in one or more of the other cases.  
However, the problem with this solution is that if this were the case then we should 
expect this to show up in our evaluations of Cases One, Two and Three. If the reasons 
in one of the cases were not reasons with the same polarity in one or more of the other 
cases then we should be capable of appreciating this fact. Unfortunately for this 
response, though, this is not the case.19 The self-interested reasons that count in 
favour of going to the exam in Case One seem to count in favour of doing so in Cases 
Two and Three as well. Similarly, the moral reasons that count in favour of taking the 
woman to hospital seems to count in favour of doing so in all of the cases. Finally, the 
                                                        
17 (2004 pp.73-4). It is worth noting that Dancy’s account of reasons offers additional 
resources for responding to this problem. In particular, his distinction between 
enticing and peremptory reasons (2006) might be thought to provide a possible 
solution to this problem. See §6 for a discussion of this distinction.  
18 (2004 pp.73-4). 
19 Dorsey makes a similar response (2013 p.367 fn.16).  
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moral reasons that count against taking the car in Case Two seem to count against 
doing so in Case Three as well.  
Perhaps, though, Holism might be thought to undermine the motivation for thinking 
that this relation would ever be transitive. After all, if reasons for action are context 
sensitive then there is no reason to expect this relation to be transitive. However, 
while it is true that a holist should have no expectations about the transitivity of the 
permissible alternative relation and so no reason to accept Claim Four, they do have 
reason to accept the following claim: 
Claim Four*: If reasons R are capable of playing a moral justificatory role against 
moral reasons of strength s then, assuming that reasons R retain their strength and 
polarity, for any x, R should be capable of playing that role against moral reasons of 
strength s – x. 
While holists about reasons may have no reason to accept Claim Four they do have 
reason to accept Claim Four*. After all, if we are comparing cases where the reasons 
in play retain their strength and polarity then surely the ‘is a permissible alternative 
to’ should be transitive. Simply accepting Holism, then, may give us good reason to 
reject Claim Four but it does not provide a solution to the problem. 
However, Claim Four* points towards an alternative solution that that is available to 
the holist. Rather than claiming that it is the existence or polarity of the reasons that 
alters between the three cases, a holist could instead claim that it is the strength of the 
reasons that changes. As Sean McKeever and Mike Ridge point out, a reason may 
retain its polarity in different contexts but vary in strength as the result of the presence 
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or absence of intensifiers or diminishers.20 If the strength of a reason is context 
sensitive then it should be no surprise that the ‘is a permissible alternative to’ relation 
is not transitive.  
Perhaps, then, the holist could argue that there are features of the context in Cases 
One, Two or Three that are playing an intensifying or diminishing role. There are 
three options here. First, the self-interested reason that support going to the exam 
could be being intensified in Case One or diminished in Case Three. Second, the 
moral reason that counts in favour of taking the woman to hospital could be 
diminished in Case One or intensified in Case Two. Finally, the moral reason that 
counts against taking the neighbour’s car could be diminished in Case Two or 
intensified in Case Three. Unfortunately for this solution, it does not seem as if any of 
these options are plausible. Most obviously, the strength of the moral reason that 
supports taking the woman to hospital appears completely unchanged between Cases 
One and Two. Similarly, the strength of the self-interested reason to go to the exam 
seems just as strong as in Cases One and Three. Finally, in Cases Two and Three, it 
does not seem to be the strength of the moral reasons against taking the neighbour’s 
car that changes. In all of these cases, it appears as if these reasons are overridden 
rather than diminished.  
Of course, there is a limit to how much weight we should give these intuitions. After 
all, while the strength of these reasons may not appear to change between these three 
cases this does lead to the counter intuitive result that the permissibility relation is not 
transitive. It is open then for the advocate of this approach to make a case for the 
existence of intensifiers or diminishers in one or more of these cases. However, in 
                                                        
20 (2006 p.28). 
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order for this solution to work the holist will need to point out what feature of the 
contexts in these three cases is playing an intensifying or diminishing role. Without 
such an explanation this solution will fail to satisfy SOLVE THE PROBLEM. This 
solution, then, will only be a live option if such an account could be given. In the 
absence of such an account we appear to have good reason to look elsewhere for a 
solution to The Transitivity Problem. Moreover, even if an account of the relevant 
intensifiers and diminishers were on the table there seems to be good reason to seek 
out an alternative account, for the simple reason that if no alternative account can be 
found then this might well be thought to provide an argument in favour of the 
existence of intensifiers and diminishers. We should not, then, rule out the possibility 
of some form of holist solution. We do, though, have sufficient reason to look 
elsewhere for a solution to the problem.  
4. Dorsey’s Solution 
Dorsey suggests an alternative response in his attempt to provide a solution to ‘The 
Problem of Supererogation’.21 Dorsey argues that it is a mistake to view 
supererogatory acts as acts that are morally better than the acts we are morally 
required to perform. Instead we should view these acts as morally better than the acts 
we are rationally required to perform.22 According to Dorsey, we are always morally 
required to perform the morally best act available. However, not all acts that we are 
morally required to perform are also acts that we are rationally required to perform.23 
                                                        
21 Elsewhere I argue that Dorsey’s attempt to solve The Paradox of Supererogation 
fails, Archer (Forthcoming). For the purposes of this paper though,  I only aim to 
show that Dorsey’s solution to The Transitivity Problem fails. 
22 (2013 p.371). Dorsey expands his discussion in his forthcoming book (2016) but his 
criticism of Portmore and his own account remain in all important respects the same. 
For ease of reference I will focus on his published paper.  
23 (2013 pp.372-3). See also Dorsey (2012). 
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If we accept Dorsey’s view then it seems like we should reject Claims One and Two. 
Given that we are morally required to do what is best, in both Case One and Case 
Two we are morally required to drive to the hospital. Claims One and Two then 
should be revised as follows: 
Claim One*: In Case One it is rationally permissible for Charlie to go to the exam 
rather than taking Jane to hospital. In other words, Charlie’s self-interested reasons 
rationally justify the performance of the less morally favoured act. 
 
Claim Two*: In Case Two it is rationally permissible and morally better for Charlie 
to take the car in order to drive the injured woman to hospital. This is because the 
moral reasons that support taking the woman to hospital override the moral reasons 
that count against taking the car. 
 
Dorsey can, though, accept Claim Three as it stands. It remains the case on his view 
that Charlie is morally required not to take his neighbour’s car in Case Three.  
 
However, given that Dorsey is committed to accepting claims One* and Two* it 
looks like he is also committed to accepting that it is rationally permissible for Charlie 
to take the neighbour’s car without permission in order to get to the exam on time. 
After all, if it is rationally permissible to choose going to the exam over driving the 
woman to hospital and it is rationally permissible to choose driving the woman to 
hospital even if this means taking the neighbour’s car without permission then surely 
it should also be rationally permissible to choose to go to the exam even if this means 
taking the neighbour’s car without permission. The problem does not stop here, as if 
we accept Dorsey’s account then not only is it rationally permissible for Charlie to 
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take the car in Case Three, it is also supererogatory not to do so. This seems to be the 
wrong result. If you are running late for an exam it is not supererogatory to decide not 
to take a neighbour’s car without permission, it is obligatory. Dorsey’s solution then, 
fails to satisfy RESPECT THE INTUITIONS.  
 
While acknowledging the force of these objections, Dorsey claims that these 
problems are far less serious than those we are faced with if we accept the traditional 
view of supererogation. Dorsey supports this claim in three ways.24  
  
First, there are additional resources available for responding to this objection that are 
not available to someone seeking to respond to the original problem. As the problem 
facing Dorsey’s view is one of rational permission rather than moral permission he 
can appeal to additional non-moral reasons that might count against taking the car in 
Case Three. Dorsey says that reasons of neighbourliness, association and etiquette 
may provide additional non-moral reasons not to take the car in this case. If we accept 
that these additional non-moral reasons are in play in this case then this allows Dorsey 
to say that Charlie is not rationally permitted to take the car and, as a result, it would 
not be supererogatory for him not to do so.  
 
This response though, rests upon the controversial claim that these reasons are non-
moral rather than moral reasons. Much more would need to be said before we can 
accept that this is a satisfactory response to the problems facing Dorsey’s view. 
Moreover, if we accept this response in Case Three then it looks like it should also 
work in the other cases. In Case One for example, there appear to be a number of 
                                                        
24 (2013 pp. 26-27). 
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similar reasons that might be in play. Reasons of community and etiquette might well 
count in favour of driving to the hospital in this case. This, though, does not seem 
sufficient to prevent the act from being supererogatory.  
 
Second, we could restrict the supererogatory to a subset of those acts that are morally 
better than what is rationally required. Dorsey suggests if we restrict the 
supererogatory to beneficent acts then we avoid having to class not taking the car in 
Case Three as supererogatory.25  
 
There are, though, two problems with this view. First, this is a view that several 
authors writing on supererogation argue against. 26 In order for this response to work 
Dorsey must respond to these arguments. More worryingly, though, even if we restrict 
the term ‘supererogatory’ to acts that are beneficent, the act of not taking the car in 
Case Three would remain beyond the call of duty on Dorsey’s terms and this seems 
no less counter intuitive than describing the act as supererogatory. This response fails 
to provide a full solution to the problem and so does not satisfy SOLVE THE 
PROBLEM. 
 
Finally, Dorsey claims that even if we accept that these are genuine problems for his 
view these worries are significantly less problematic than the problems facing those 
who accept the standard picture of the supererogatory. The problem facing the 
standard view is that it appears to be committed to the view that it is morally 
permissible to take the car in Case Three. Dorsey claims that this is far more 
                                                        
25 (2013 p.27). Cf. Heyd (1982 pp. 115, 136, 137).  
26 See Archer (2013) and Mellema (1991 pp.19-20). 
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problematic than a commitment to saying that not taking the car is supererogatory. At 
best, though, this only gives us reason to think that Dorsey’s solution is preferable to 
biting the bullet and accepting that it would be morally permissible for Charlie to take 
the car in Case Three. Given that we have already rejected this option, Dorsey’s 
comparative point gives us little reason to accept his solution.  
 
As it stands, then, none of these replies offers a satisfactory response to the problems 
facing this view. Furthermore, redefining supererogation in the way Dorsey suggests 
is problematic in its own right. The reason this is problematic is that on Dorsey’s view 
we are unable to say everything we want to say about these three cases. Take Case 
One. We wanted to say that it is not morally wrong to go to the exam rather than drive 
to the hospital. On Dorsey’s view this is false. More generally, we want to say that the 
acts that saints and heroes perform are morally better than what they morally have to 
do; not that they are better than what they are rationally required to do. Again on 
Dorsey’s view this would be wrong. The fact that Dorsey’s account is revisionary in 
this way is far from a decisive objection. Nevertheless, given that his account also 
faces the problem of wrongly characterizing not taking the neighbour’s car in Case 
Three I take this to be sufficient reason to look elsewhere for a solution.  
  
 5. Three Roles For Moral Reasons  
So far I have looked at two groups of solutions to The Transitivity Problem. One 
involved reinterpreting Claims One, Two and Three and the other involved rejecting 
Claim Four. I will now propose a novel solution that allows us to hold onto Claims 
One, Two and Three and endorse a slightly modified version of Claim Four.  
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To start let’s look more closely at Portmore’s claim, mentioned briefly in §1, about 
the two moral roles that reasons can play. According to Portmore we can distinguish 
between two forms of strength that moral reasons can possess: 
Moral Requiring Strength: A reason has morally requiring strength to the extent that 
it can make it morally impermissible to refrain from performing acts that it would 
otherwise be morally permissible to refrain from performing. 
Moral Justifying Strength: A reason has morally justifying strength to the extent that 
it can make it morally permissible to perform acts that it would otherwise be morally 
impermissible to perform.27 
Portmore claims that non-moral reasons, reasons that do not count for or against 
performing an act from the moral point of view, may nevertheless play a moral 
justificatory role. It is important to note though that once we have accepted that moral 
justifying strength is to some extent independent from moral requiring strength then 
                                                        
27 (2011 p.121). Compare Joshua Gert’s criteria for rational requiring strength and 
rational justifying strength (2003). A related distinction is Dancy’s distinction 
between peremptory and enticing reasons. According to Dancy, peremptory reasons 
are those that, “are in the business of telling us what to do,” (2006 p.91). Enticing 
reasons, on the other hand, “are more to do with making an option attractive rather 
than demanded, required or right,” (2006 p.91). We might think that this distinction 
would also provide a solution to The Transitivity Problem. However, it seems 
plausible to think that all of the possible acts in the three cases are supported by 
peremptory reasons. Given that Dancy claims that requiring reasons will always 
defeat peremptory reasons (2006 p.99) it doesn’t look like this distinction will have 
sufficient resources to reconcile the four claims made in Section One. 
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an interesting possibility emerges. It might be the case that moral reasons can also 
possess moral justifying strength without possessing the same level of moral requiring 
strength.28  
Once we accept the possibility that the moral requiring strength of a moral reason 
might be different from the moral justifying strength then an interesting solution to 
The Transitivity Problem emerges. Perhaps, the lack of transitivity between Cases 
One, Two and Three can be explained by the fact that the moral reasons in play 
possess moral justifying strengths that are not identical to their moral requiring 
strengths. On this view, the moral justifying strength of a moral reason can be 
different from its moral requiring strength. In fact this solution appears very attractive 
when we consider the three cases. In Case Two driving the woman to hospital is 
morally better than opting not to take the neighbour’s car without permission. Note 
that though this act is morally better it is not morally required. This suggests that an 
act’s moral requiring strength may not be directly tied to how morally good the act is. 
This would also explain why the act that is less favoured in Case Two may 
nevertheless have more requiring force.  We can see how this might work by 
assigning numbers to represent the moral requiring and justifying force of the reasons 
that support each act in the following way: 
 
 
                                                        
28 We might think that Portmore is implicitly committed to this view, as he claims that 
some moral reasons may possess no moral requiring force (2011 p.122 Fn.6 and p.135 








Go To Exam 
 
0 5 







Of course, we might quibble with the way in which the numbers are assigned in each 
case. We might think, for example, that going to the exam is supported by moral 
reasons with some morally requiring strength. The important point, however, is not 
about how these numbers have been assigned but in the possibilities that assigning 
numbers in these ways opens up.  Let’s assume that an act is morally permissible if 
and only if it is supported by reasons that possess moral justifying strength that is at 
least equal to the moral requiring strength of the reasons supporting any of the 
alternative acts. We can now see why it is that the ‘is a permissible alternative to’ 
relation is not transitive. Going to the exam is supported by reasons with sufficient 
moral justificatory force to make it a permissible alternative to taking the woman to 
hospital. This in turn is supported by reasons with sufficient moral justificatory force 
to make it permissible for Charlie to take the woman to hospital even though it means 
taking his neighbour’s car without permission. However, going to the exam is not 
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supported by reasons with sufficient moral justificatory force to make it permissible 
for Charlie to take his neighbour’s car without permission. Note that this view allows 
us to retain Claim Four with one slight modification:  
Claim Four**: If reasons R are capable of playing a moral justificatory role against 
moral reasons of requiring strength s then, for any x, R should be capable of playing 
that role against moral reasons of requiring strength s - x. 
The original version of Claim 4 did not stipulate which form of strength (requiring or 
justifying) was being referred to. Once we make clear that we are discussing requiring 
strength then we can hold onto this claim. Strictly speaking then, if we accept this 
solution then ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ is not a transitive relation. 
However, this solution can provide a perfect explanation as to why it appeared 
plausible to think that it would be. The reason why the transitive relation picked out 
by Claim Four appeared so plausible is that it is very close to a form of transitivity 
that does hold, namely that picked out by Claim Four **. This solution, then, satisfies 
RESPECT THE INTUITIONS by offering a vindicating explanation for the intuitions 
behind Claims One, Two and Three and a debunking explanation for the intuitions 
that motivated Claim Four.  
Moreover, this solution is able to accommodate these intuitions in a way that pushes 
forward the project of attempting to explain the connection between moral 
permissibility and reasons for action. As a result, this solution also satisfies SAVE 
THE PROJECT. 
As it stands, though, an important problem remains. We might wonder how we can 
talk about one act being better than another if reasons can possess two different kinds 
of moral strength. In Case Two, for example, we want to say more than just that both 
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acts are morally permissible. We also want to be able to say that taking the woman to 
hospital is the morally better of the two. At the moment though, it seems that all we 
can say is that this act possesses greater moral justificatory force but less moral 
requiring force.  
We can solve this problem by positing a third kind of moral strength that reasons can 
possess. In addition to possessing moral requiring and moral justifying strength, 
reasons can also possess moral favouring strength. We can define this in the 
following way: 
Moral Favouring Strength: A reason has moral favouring strength to the extent that it 
increases how favourably the act should be judged from the moral point of view.29 
A more explicit endorsement of a similar position is offered by Terence Horgan and 
Mark Timmons, who argue that in addition to playing moral requiring and moral 
                                                        
29 It is worth noting that Portmore appears committed to the existence of this third 
moral role that reasons can play. In describing moral reasons as playing, “at least two 
normative roles,” Portmore actually commits himself to the view that there are at least 
three different normative roles that such reasons play. This is because he has defined 
moral reasons as reasons that count for or against performing an act from the moral 
point of view. This role of counting for or against from the moral point of view must 
be distinct from a reason having moral requiring force, as Portmore accepts the 
possibility that a moral reason could have no moral requiring force. (2011 p.122 Fn.6 
and p.135 Fn.22). 
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justifying roles moral reasons can also play a moral merit-conferring role.30 Horgan 
and Timmons support their position by offering the following example:  
Olivia’s offer. Olivia and her husband Stan have recently moved to St. Louis, 
each having accepted an academic appointment at one of the local universities. 
During their first week in their new home, Olivia attends a block party 
organized by one of their new neighbors where she meets a recently widowed 
woman, Mary, a neighbor who lives a few doors down from Olivia and Stan. 
In conversation, Olivia learns that Mary lost her husband to cancer after forty-
eight years of marriage. She also learns that Mary is an avid baseball fan and 
that she and her husband used to regularly attend Cardinals games. But 
without anyone to go with, she doesn’t go anymore. The next day, it occurs to 
Olivia that it would be a nice gesture to offer to go to a Cardinals game with 
Mary, although she herself has no particular interest in the game. But she 
thinks: “Here is a chance to do something nice for someone, and the fall 
semester doesn’t begin for another couple of weeks. Why not?” She calls 
Mary, who is delighted by the invitation, and they end up going to a game.31 
Horgan and Timmons claim that in this example there are moral reasons that count in 
favour of Olivia making this invitation but that these reasons lack any requiring 
                                                        
30 (2010 p.54). This position is not identical to mine as their ‘merit-conferring role’ 
looks not only at the reasons favouring the act but also at the reasons on which the 
agent acted. I take this merit-conferring role to depend on the existence of a moral 
favouring role.  
31 (2010 p.47). 
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force.32 In my terminology, then, this act is supported by reasons that are playing a 
moral favouring role (and also a moral justifying role) but not a moral requiring role.  
Accepting that reasons can play a moral favouring role allows us to capture 
everything we wanted to say about our three cases, as the following table 
demonstrates:  
Figure 2:  






Go To Exam 
 
0 5 0 
Take Woman to 
Hospital  
5 10 10 
Don’t Take 
Neighbour’s Car 
8 8 8 
 
With the introduction of the moral favouring role we are able to see that taking the 
woman to hospital is the morally best of the three acts while not taking the 
neighbour’s car is morally better than going to the exam. As a result, this solution 
succeeds in satisfying SOLVE THE PROBLEM.  
In this section I have outline my own solution to The Transitivity Problem. I have 
argued that by allowing for three different moral roles that reasons can play and that 
the moral justifying strength of a reason can be different from its moral requiring 
                                                        
32 (2010 p.48). 
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strength we are able to say everything we wanted to say about our three cases. I have 
shown that, unlike the other solutions I have investigated, this solution succeeds in 
satisfying all three of the desiderata proposed in §2. In order to make this solution 
more satisfying however, something needs to be said about why it is plausible to think 
that the moral justifying and favouring strength of a reason might vary from its moral 
requiring strength.  
One reason plausible reason why these different kinds of strength might come apart 
concerns the different kinds of moral reason that exist. In Jamie Dreier’s discussion of 
the paradox of supererogation he argues that moral reasons can be divided into those 
concerned with justice and those concerned with beneficence.33 While reasons of 
justice are capable of generating moral requirements, reasons of beneficence are not. 
As it stands this view is too strong, as it appears that there are times when reasons of 
beneficence do generate moral obligations. In Peter Singer’s example of a child 
drowning in a pond that can easily be saved at the expense of muddying a new suit it 
appears both that the reasons that support saving the child are reasons of beneficence 
and that they generate a moral obligation in this case. Nevertheless, a weaker version 
of Dreier’s view might well prove fruitful here. Consider the following claim made by 
John Stuart Mill: “Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern 
the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute 
obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life”.34 Mill’s point is that because 
of the special importance of reasons of justice, it is generally more important that we 
follow these reasons than other forms of moral reasons, though there will be 
                                                        
33 Dreier (2004 p.149). 
34 (1863/ 2001 p.59). 
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occasions where this is not the case.35 If we accept this then it seems reasonable to 
conclude that reasons of justice have greater requiring force than other moral reasons, 
such as reasons of beneficence. This allows us to explain why the reasons that support 
taking the woman to hospital possess less requiring force than the reasons that speak 
against taking the neighbour’s car without permission, despite the fact that the former 
reasons possess more favouring strength than the latter. After all, it seems plausible to 
suggest that the former reasons are reasons of beneficence while the latter are reasons 
of justice. By distinguishing between different kinds of moral reason then, we are able 
to explain why the moral requiring force of a reason can vary from its justifying or 
favouring force.  
6. Objections and Responses 
One objection that might be raised against the solution I outlined in the previous 
section is that it is incompatible with popular conceptions of what reasons are. One 
way to make this objection would be to claim that all reasons are deontic by nature.36 
John Broome, for example, has claimed that, “if you have a reason to q and no reason 
not to q, then you ought to q.”37 We might think that the claim that reasons are 
capable of playing three different moral roles is incompatible with this claim, as it 
opens up the possibility that a reason could play a favouring or justifying role without 
playing a requiring role. Moreover, in the previous table it was claimed that going to 
the exam is an act that has no requiring force. If we accept this then it looks like the 
reasons in favour of this act do not fit with Broome’s claim about reasons.  
                                                        
35 (2001 p.64). 
36 This view is endorsed by both Kagan (1989) and Raz (1999).  
37 (1999 p.400).  
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One way to respond to this objection would be to claim that Broome’s view is one 
that ought to be rejected. I think there is good reason to think that this is right.38 
However, there is no need to commit myself to this claim in order to respond to this 
objection, as my view is compatible with Broome’s claim. After all, Broome’s claim 
is about the connection between reasons and normative requirements. My claim in the 
previous table that an act can have moral justifying force without possessing any 
moral requiring force is compatible with Broome’s claim about normative 
requirements. In fact it seems very plausible to think that there is a normative 
requirement to go to the exam in the absence of any reason to the contrary.  
Another claim about reasons that my claims in the previous section appear to be 
incompatible with is T.M. Scanlon’s claim that what it is for x to be reason for 
something is for x to be, “a consideration that counts in favour of it.”39 This view 
appears incompatible with the thought that the reasons that make it morally justified 
to go to the exam rather than to drive the injured woman to hospital do not morally 
count in favour of performing this act. After all, these are reasons but do not count in 
favour of performing the act.  
On closer inspection, though, this worry is misplaced. While these reasons may not 
count in favour of performing the act from the point of view of morality they do count 
in favour of doing so from the prudential point of view and from the all things 
considered normative point of view.  
                                                        
38 See Dancy (2006) and Little (2013) for arguments against this conception of 
reasons.  
39 (1998 p.17).  
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One response that might be made here is to claim that this prevents these reasons from 
counting as moral reasons. Just as to be a reason in general for something is to count 
in favour of it, perhaps to be a moral reason for something is to morally count in 
favour of it. If we accept this then it seems we are committed to saying that reasons 
that play a morally justifying role without playing a moral favouring role are not 
moral reasons.  
However, there doesn’t seem to be any reason to think that it would be problematic to 
be committed to this position. As Portmore has pointed out, we can say that while a 
reason that does not count in favour of performing an act from the moral point of 
view may not be a moral reason, it can still be a morally relevant reason.40 In other 
words we can say that while the reasons that support going to the exam are not ones 
that count in favour of performing this act from the moral point of view they do play a 
role in determining what is morally permissible. Once we appreciate that we can 
understand these reasons in this way there no longer appears to be any problem with 
saying that this act is not supported by moral reasons, as they can still be morally 
relevant reasons.  
Another way in which the solution offered in the previous section might be thought to 
rest on a flawed conception of reasons is that appears to make it unclear how we 
should understand the strength of a reason. Is the strength of a reason determined by 
its justificatory strength, its requiring strength or its favouring strength?41 It isn’t 
immediately clear what my account should say in response to this question, as it 
would seem arbitrary to pick one over the others. Perhaps it might instead be 
                                                        
40 (2011 Ch.5).  
41
 Thanks to Mike Ridge for raising this objection.  
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suggested that this phrase is simply ambiguous between the three terms. This though 
will appear unsatisfactory unless we can give an explanation for this ambiguity. Note 
that the simple favouring account faces no such problems here, as the strength of a 
reason can be understood straightforwardly in terms of how strongly a reason counts 
in favour of performing some action. 
However, an alternative view of reasons that has attracted a number of supporters in 
recent years can provide us with the resources to give a unified account of a reason’s 
strength. According to a number of theorists, reasons are premises of successful 
reasoning. As Jonathan Way describes the view: “What it is for some consideration to 
be a reason to ψ is for it to be a premise of good reasoning towards ψ-ing.”42 This 
alternative account of the nature of reasons allows us to say that the strength of a 
reason can be understood in terms of how much weight it would be appropriate to 
give it when reasoning well.43 Of course, the effect this strength will have on what 
would count as good reasoning will depend on whether the strength is requiring, 
justifying or favouring. In all three cases, though, the strength of the reason will 
determine what weight it would be appropriate to give it in our reasoning.  
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have investigated whether the ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ 
is a transitive relation. I started by introducing a set of cases that appeared to cast 
doubt on the transitivity of this relation. This created a puzzle, as there seemed to be 
good reason to think that the relation is transitive. I then set out three desiderata that a 
                                                        
42 Way (Forthcoming). Setiya (2014) defends a similar view.  
43 See Way (Forthcoming) for a detailed account of how to give an account of the 
weight of reasons using this approach.   
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successful solution to this puzzle should satisfy. I then looked at three attempts to 
solve the problem and argued that they all failed to satisfy all three desiderata. 
Finally, I proposed my own solution to the problem, which involves positing three 
different moral roles that reasons can play: a justifying role, a requiring role and a 
favouring role. If we accept that moral reasons can play these three distinct roles and 
that a reason’s strength may vary across these three roles then this provides us with a 
solution to the puzzle that satisfies all three desiderata. 
This solution has important wider implications for moral philosophy. If no 
satisfactory solution to this problem had been available then this would have cast 
serious doubt on our ability to give a systematic account of the relationship between 
moral reasons and moral permissibility. This in turn would have had important 
implications for normative ethics, as it is particularly incumbent upon 
consequentialists to give a full ranking of acts from better to worse in order to use this 
ranking to determine which acts are morally permissible. My solution allows us to 
avoid these doubts.  
Finally, my solution raises an interesting question about practical requirements more 
generally that is worthy of future investigation. My solution to this problem provided 
an explanation as to why the ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ relation is not 
transitive. An interesting question for future research is whether it is plausible to think 
that the same is true for the ‘is a rationally permissible alternative to’ relation.44  
                                                        
44 Thanks to audiences at The University of Bristol, The 2015 Society of Applied 
Philosophy Annual Conference at The University of Edinburgh, The 2015 Meetings in 
Ethics and Political Philosophy at The University of Minho and The 2015 MANCEPT 
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